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COMMENT.
"VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA."
In case of a violation of a specific statutory duty by an employer,
resulting in an injury to an employee, is the latter deprived of his
remedy for private injury by his knowledge and appreciation of the
risk? If the master intentionally disregards the statute, does his
servant being fully aware of the violation of law and appreciating
the resulting condition and dangers, continue in the employment at
his own risk or at the risk of his employer?
The authorities are in sharp conflict on this proposition. On
one hand are arrayed the courts of Massachusetts, New York and
Iowa; on the other the English courts and those of Illinois, Missouri,
Ohio and Indiana, as well as the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals.
(See Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 121 (2nd ed.). 47 L. R. A. 19o,
note.)
The first of these two opposing theories insists that the distinc-
tion is not to be drawn between employment under conditions con-
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demned as dangerous at the common law and those prohibited by
statute; that in the absence of an assumption of the risk an omission
of duty implied by law is precisely as effective in fixing liability as
though enjoined by statute; that the statute does not deprive indi-
viduals of the free agency and right to manage their own affairs
and establish such of their respective rights and duties as they may
choose; that "there is no rule of public policy which prevents an
employee from deciding whether in view of increased wages, the
difficulties of employment, or other sufficient reasons it may not be
wise and prudent to accept employment subject to the rule of
obvious risks"; and that the maxim "ifolenti non fit injuria," in such
cases will apply notwithstanding the master's violation of statutory
requirements.
The second line of cases which, adopting the theory and reasoning
of the English courts, maintain that there ought to be no encourage-
ment given to the making of an agreement between two persons
that one of them shall be at liberty to break the law which has been
passed for the protection of the other, hold that such an agreement
would be in violation of sound public policy and ought not to be lis-
tened to; that it must be assumed "that the manifest legislative pur-
pose was to protect the servant by positive law because he had not
shown himself capable of protecting himself by contract, and that it
would enirely defeat this purpose to permit the servant to contract the
master out of the statute"; and that the master may not be allowed
to set up a defense that he has violated no legal duty because the
-7 7vant by express or implied contract lifted off his shoulders that
which the statute had laid upon them.
'he leading decision affirming the application of the *maxim in
such cases is that of O'Maley v. Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135. In
New York the doctrine laid down by the Massachusetts court was
adopted in Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372. It has been emphati-
cally reaffirmed in Iowa in Martin v. Chicago, R. L & P. R. R. Co.,
91 \,. W. 1034 (Oct. 1902) wherein the Court say, "It would be
quite as obnoxious to public policy, independent of the penalty
imposed, for an employee to aid and encourage the employer in his
disregard of ordinances, as for the employer to violate it. . . In
the matter of assumption of risks, it is immaterial whether they
arise from violation of common law duty or an obligation imposed
by statute." The Court also criticize the opinion of judge Taft
in Narranzore v. Railroad Co.. 37 C. C. A. 499.
Taking the other view is another recent case. in Indiana, Mon-
teith v. Kokomo Wood Enameling Co., 64 N. E 6Io (Sup. Ct. Ind.
1902), which was an action for injuries from saw-mill machinery
operated in an unguarded manner in violation of statute. It was
there held that the maxim "Volenti non fit injuria'" is not applicable
in cases where injury arises from the breach of statutory duty. and
the workman was allowed to recover.
It thus appears that the rule of the English cases and the Massa-
chusetts doctrine are too completely contrary to be reconcilable other
than by specific statutory enactments with such an end in view.
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It will be interesting, however, to watch the spread of the two
opposing opinions to other states.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF ACTION AFTER FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH STATE REGISTRY LAW.
The courts of the various States have long been in conflict as tothe right of a foreign corporation to sue on a contract when it has
failed to comply with the requirements of the State in regard to
acquiring the right of doing business in the State.
In a recent case in Pennsylvania-Delaware Riz'er Quarry &
Construction Co. v. Bethlehem & Nazareth Passenger Railway Co.
et al., 53 Atl. 533-this subject is again brought to our notice.
In this case a New Jersey corporation had constructed a railroad
for a Pensylvania company without having registered in Pennsyl-
vania, which was required as a condition precedent to the right of
doing busines in that State. It was held that the company could
not sue on a quantuon incruit to recover for labor and materials and
that any contract, express or implied, made by this company. within
the State. was absolutely void. The reasoning of the court is to the
effect that this is a contract made in violation of the provisions
of the constitution and laws of the State, and, therefore, it is
against public policy.to enforce it. Parish v. *Wheeler, 22 N. Y.
494; Whitmore v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 253.
In direct conflict with this doctrine is that upheld in Tennessee
and Alabama-Trust Co. z,. Willhoit, 84 Fed. 514; Sherwood v.
AlVis, 83 Ala. II 5--vhich follows the same reasoning as that laiddown in the Supreme Court of the United States, Fritts v. Palmer,
132 U. S. 282, where the leading cases on the subject are cited.
Here it is held that a contract of this nature is not against publicpolicy, is not invalid as between the parties and can only be inter-
fered with at the instance of the State. This holding is in exactaccord with the doctrine in regard to the restriction on the holding
of real estate by national banks. Gold Mining Co. v. National
Bank, 96 U. S. 640.
Another line of cases, following a decision in New York-
Creleld Mills z% Goddard, 69 Fed. 14i-hold that a State law ofthis kind is merely a State regulation, and that its only effect is to
suspend the right to sue until the requirements are complied with.
Sullivan v. Beck, 79 Fed. 2oo; Gas 'Pipe Co. v. Conell, 33 N. Y.
Supp. 482.
The practical result of the holding in New York seems to vary
but slightly from the result of that in Tennessee. Both States makeit possible for a corporation to disobey the law and still, by a sub-
sequent compliance, lose nothing by such action; while that in
Pennsylvania goes to the other extreme and by declaring all such
contracts absolutely void, bars the plaintiff from the protection ofthe rule that estops the defendant from claiming immunity afterhaving received some benefit, and of that principle which fixes a
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liability upon executed contracts; and it also works a great hard-
ship on any foreign corporations that have unknowingly failed to
carry out the State requirements.
However, under the latter holding, the law would almost invari-
ably be obeyed, while under the former, no corporation would feel
called upon to obey the statutes until it became necessary for them
to bring some action or suit.
THE EXTENT OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL'S RIGHT TO REGULATE
THE USE OF THE MAILS.
How wide a discretion has the postmaster general in detierm-
ining what are fraudulent enterprises? Can he supplement the
regulations of Congress in determining what is second-class matter?
These two questions have been decided in the recent cases of Ameri-
can School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33,
and Payne v. United States, 30 Wash. L. Rep. 791. In the first
case the delivery of mail addressed to the plaintiff was prohibited
by the postmaster general on the ground that its business of prac-
ticing and teaching by correspondence a system of healing diseases
through the influence of the mind over the body was fraudulent.
The Supreme Court regarded this action as in excess of authority
and granted injunctive relief. While refusing to discuss whether
the statute under which the Department acted, sec. 3929 U. S.
Revised Statutes, is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion against the deprivation of property without due process of
law, the court, White and McKenna. J. J., dissenting, holds that the
authority to exclude extends only to cases of fraud in fact, and
that the question as to whether magnetic healing is a fraud, is one
of opinion depending entirely upon individual belief and differing
only in degree from a belief in any particular theory of medicine,
electrical treatment, vaccination, or homeopathy, and is, therefore,
not a proper subject for the decision of either an administrative
officer or the courts. The attitude of the Missouri Supreme Court
toward Christian science in the very recent case of IVetiter 'u.
Bishop. 71 S. V. 167, is of interest in this connection as expressing
the view that those claiming medical powers must prove them to the
court on a basis of natural power and that the fact that witnesses
claim to have benefited thereby is not of itself sufficient. The
opinion reads, in part: "If there was anything in the plaintiff's
business, which they called magnetic healing, that entitled it to the
protection of the law and which was not perceptible to the unin-
structed, the burden was on them to show the rationale of it, and
failing to do so the court should close its door against them."
In the second case, that of Payne v. United States, sitpra. the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia holds that the post-
master general has not the right to add to the regulations of Con-
gress as to what shall constitute second-class matter, a provision
that "periodical publications having the characteristics of books"
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shall not be so admitted. The decision is based on the rule laid
down in Morrell v. Jones, io6 U. S. 466, that all an administrative
officer can do is to regulate the mode of proceeding to carry into
effect what Congress has enacted. The case arose from an attempt
to exclude the "Travellers' Official Guide," a publication issued
quarterly in large volumes. At second-class rates it was being
transmitted for only forty cents per number a year whereas it was
costing the government two dollars a year. But it seems that the
only remedy to cure this inequality lies in the hands of Congress.
IIUSIDAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S TORTS AS AFFECTED BY MARRIED
WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS.
A recent California case decides that the husband is still liable
jointly with his wife for torts committed by her and not connected
'with her separate property, notwithstanding recent legislation in
that State giving the wife the right to sue and be sued, and contract
in respect to her own property, as if she were a feme sole. Henley
.. l'ilso n. 70 Pac. 21. This case raises the very interesting ques-
tion as to how far the marital relation and the common law liabilities
accruing from it, have been affected by these Married Women's
Property Acts. The question has been decided both ways and even
those cases which hold that his liability has been removed assign
varying reasons.
In an English case decided in I9OO, the court was asked to over-
rule a previous case (Seroka v. Kattenburg, 17 Q. B. D. 177), in
which it was held that the effect of the Married Women's Act was
not to change the husband's liability; but the court declined to do
this, saying that since those acts did not expressly remove his lia-
bility, it still existed. Earle z. Kingscote, I Ch. 203. See also
Fowler -'. Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9. The court in these two cases
was content with saying that his liability was due to the common
law rule which could not be repealed by implication. And the
courts taking this view, generally refuse to go behind the common
law rule in search of the reason for it.
But the courts (and they are in the minority) which hold that
the husband's liability has been removed, do go behind the rule for
its reasons, and say that its further application is inconsistent with
the spirit of the acts in question. But even these courts disagree
as to what the reasons for the rule are. Some find it to be that
the husband had possession and control of the wife's property.
This view is taken by Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129, and the court
proceeds to justify its finding that the common law was abrogated
by this legislation, in these words: "A liability which has for its
consideration rights conferred, should no longer exist when the con-
sideration has failed [the husband's right to the control and posses-
sion of her property is taken away by these acts]. If the relations
of husband and wife have been so changed as to deprive him of all
right to her property, and to the control of her person and her time,
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every principle of right would be violated, to hold him still respon-
sible for her conduct. If she is emancipated, he should no longer
be enslaved."
But others of these courts trace his liability to the. common law
conception of the marriage itself, and especially of the status of the
wife during coveture. A reference to a few of the cases will show
why, upon this view, the courts hold that the husband is not liable. In
the eye of the common law the personal existence of the wife was
fused into that of the husband. I BI. Comm. 442-444. Hence it
is said that the husband is liable for the ante-nuptial debts of his
wife, not because he, through marriage, becomes entitled to "her
personal property, but because that during coveture the legal exist-
ence of the wife is suspended. Alexander v. Morgan, 31 0. St.
548; Com. v. Feeney, 13 Allen 56o. And so he is liable at common
law for his wife's torts, not because her wrong .is imputed to him;
nor because the influence he is supposed to exert over her is insep-
arable from her wrong doing, but for the sole reason that during
coveture, the wife is incapable of being sued alone. Capel v. Poze-
ell, 17 Q. B. (N. S.) 744; Kowing v. Manly, 49 N. Y. loi. From
this view of the question-and only from this view-we get the
following well established propositions: I. That if a married
woman be divorced, or her husband die. after she had com-
initted a tort, action would lie against her alone and would not
abate. Donge v. Pearce, 13 Ala. 127. 2. That if the husband
should die pending an action ex-delicto against both, the action
would survive him and be good as against her. Cozens v. Long,
3 N. J. Law 764. 3. But should she die pending the suit. it would
not survive as against him. Roberts v. Lisenbee, 86 N. C. 136. 41
Am. Rep. 46o.
The legitimate inference to be drawn from these propositions,
the soundness of which is not questioned, is that she herself was
personally liable-the husband being joined merely to reach her.
That this was the case, would seem to be proved by the further
fact that formerly in England she could have been imprisoned for
failure to satisfy a judgment obtained against her and the husband
jointly in an action ex-delicto (on the ground of non-payment of
debt-a judgment being in the nature of such), and that too, regard-
less as to whether the husband was thus imprisoned or not. Nowc-
ton -z. Boodle, 4 C. B. 359. If it then be true that the husband's
being joined was merely for the purpose of obtaining procedure
against her, one inclines to admit the logic of the view that holds
him no longer liable for her acts, now that she may possess and
dispose of property, contract, proceed and be proceeded against
"as if she were a feime sole."
ORNAMENTS AS FIXTURES.
The decisions in England on the subject of fixtures annexed to
the freehold for the purpose of ornament are very conflicting. An
early case, Herlakenden's Case, 2 Coke 443, expressly denied the
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right to remove fixtures put up for the purpose of ornament, while
Squier v. Mayer, 2 Freem. 249, on the other hand, gave to an execu-
tor, hangings nailed to the walls, and a furnace fixed to the freehold
and purchased with the house. In Cave v. Cave, 2 Vern. 5o8,
(i7o5), pictures put up as wainscot were held a part of the realty,
Lord Keeper saying, "the house ought not to come to the heir-
maimed and disfigured." Just one year after this decision, Beck v.
Rebown, i P. Wins. 94, was decided. This case held that a covenant
to convey a house and all things affixed to the freehold did not
include hangings and looking glasses fixed to the walls with nails
and- screws, and which were placed as wainscot, there being no
wainscot beneath.
In D'Eyencourt v. Gregory, L. R., 3 Eq. 382 (I866), it was held
that tapestries and pictures in panels, which were essentially a part
of the house, attached to the walls by a tenant for life, however
fastened, were fixtures and could not be removed. To the same
effect was Norton v. Dashwood, (1896) 2 Ch. 497.
Leigh v. Taylor, 86 Law Times Reports, 239, brings up this
question once more. A tenant for life, for the purpose of decorat-
ing the walls of a mansion-house, fixed small strips of wood by
means of nails and screws to the walls and nailed canvass to them.
He then fastened tapestries to the canvass by very small tacks and
fixed mouldings around the strips of wood by thin nails and screws,
some of which penetrated the face of the wall. The tapestries
became an essential feature to the general scheme of decoration.
The House of Lords, however, held that these tapestries, being
fixed for the purpose of ornament in the only way in which it was
possible to use and enjoy them as such, remained part of the per-
sonal estate, and did not pass to the remainder-man.
The true criterion of an immovable fixture consists in the united
application of several tests: i. Real or constructive annexation to
the realty. 2. Adaptation to the use or purpose of that part of the
realty with which it is connected. 3. Intention to make the article
a permanent accession to the freehold. Ewell on Fixture.s, p. 23.
The tendency of modern authority seems to be to give pre-eminence.
to the question of intention, the other tests deriving their chief
value as evidence of such intention.
The House of Loi ds did not hesitate to follow this tendency. It
maintained that whether or not a chattel is so annexed to the free-
hold as to be intended as an improvement to it and to pass with
it, or is annexed only for the purpose of temporary ornament, is
to be derived from the facts of each particular case. No rule can
be laid down which will in itself solve the question. Yet the law
as to ornamental fixtures does not change. It is the same now
as it was in former times. The apparent change of law is due to
the change in the mode of living, the increase of luxury making
things matter of ornament which were not so in earlier days.
That the tapestry was never intended to remain a part of the
house is evident from the nature of the attachment, the extent and
degree of which was as slight as the nature of the thing would
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admit. Since the intention was to put up the tapestry for orna-
mentation, and for the enjoyment of the person while occupying
the house, it is not under these circumstances a part of the house.
There are American cases very similar to Leigh v. Taylor,
although they are not identical, which hold that ornamental fixtures
constitute a part of the realty. In Columbia Insurance Co. T,.
Kneisley, 9 Ohio Dec. 432, bookcases and a hatrack built into a
room of a house, and which if removed would also remove a part
of the base-boards around the floor of the room, were held a part
of the realty. Mirrors set in the wall of a dwelling house, the
removal of which would leave the walls unfinished, can not be
removed. Ward v. Kilpatrick, 85 N. Y. 413, 39 Am. Rep. 674.
